{"id":14961,"date":"2021-06-22T13:52:52","date_gmt":"2021-06-22T13:52:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/startgreen.nl\/blog-2-the-results-of-7-years-of-impact-investing\/"},"modified":"2021-06-22T13:52:52","modified_gmt":"2021-06-22T13:52:52","slug":"blog-2-the-results-of-7-years-of-impact-investing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/startgreen.nl\/en\/blog-2-the-results-of-7-years-of-impact-investing\/","title":{"rendered":"Blog 2. The results of 7 years of impact investing"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\nJune 22, 2021<\/span>\n\nAt PDENH, we were able to close a series of no fewer than seven parallel follow-on investments in Q1 2021. Therefore, in this second blog, I would like to take you through the results of 7 years of impact investing and benchmark these against the industry. \n\n\n\"\" The innovative 3D printers from MX3D\n

2. The results of 7 years of impact investing<\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\nTo be specific, I am looking at the degree of success with which the start-ups have or have not progressed to ‘scale-up status’. In my view, the recently concluded ‘uprounds’ represented the definitive rite of passage<\/em> to the ‘scale-up’ label for many companies, but is this actually the case? Furthermore, since we are talking about impact investing, how much impact has been made by them in relation to the plans we initially supported? To keep things clear, I am looking strictly at the eleven startups<\/strong> where I personally initiated the first investment as Investment Manager and the companies I currently manage (or have managed). These have all been early-stage investments in my focus areas of energy storage<\/strong> (E-magy, EST-Floattech), grid balancing<\/strong> (Sympower, Dexter Energy Services), circularity<\/strong> (Chaincraft, Fairphone, MX3D), sustainable heat<\/strong> (Triple Solar, Asperitas, RGS), and sustainable mobility<\/strong> (Covadem, EST-Floattech). I am excluding the eight project financings and investments in project developers in which I was directly involved. This is because those are companies that, by definition, cannot become scale-ups. Also, investments that I supported indirectly as Investment Director, as well as the many other VC investments from StartGreen Capital and its funds, are not included in this blog. \n\nScale-up definition\n<\/span><\/strong>Striking fact: The percentage of companies that manage to grow from startup to scale-up is only 16 percent<\/strong> in the Netherlands, whereas this figure stands at 51 percent in the US<\/strong>. This is not a criticism of the quality of Dutch entrepreneurs, but in my opinion, simply a consequence of the fact that the home market is small and the European market is highly fragmented. In any case, it is essential to raise this percentage through smart collaboration. This is exactly the goal of my next blog in this series. \n\nWhat exactly is a scale-up? A Google search for ‘scale-up definition’ shows that the interpretation of this term varies considerably: \n